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TAXATION·- INSURANCE AND ANNUITY CONTRACTS UNDER THE
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX DIFFERENTIATION AND THEORIES OF TAX-

In the taxpayer's quest for methods of avoidance of the
federal estate tax, one field seems to have been generally overlooked;
viz., annuity contracts that are so similar to insurance policies as to
be treated like the latter for tax purposes, thus securing the benefit
of the $40,000 exemption in section 302 (g).1 Various reasons might
be suggested why this should be so, but the fact remains that there
has been practically no discussion of the -subject in legal publications
and, until the recent case of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,2 no litigation involving the problem. Perhaps the
principal reason for this paucity of material is the fact that little use
has been made of the annuity device until recent years. a However that
may be, the growth in interest in annuity contracts and combinations
of annuity and insurance contracts merits a discussion of the problems
they raise under the federal estate tax law.
In the Old Colony Trust Co. case the contract entered into between
the decedent and the life insurance company provided that in consideration of the payment of the single "premium" of $42,000, the
company would pay to decedent ( therein called the "annuitant") a
yearly annuity of $r400 during his lifetime, and would pay at his
ATION -

1 Revenue Act of 1926, § 3oz (g), 44 Stat. L. 70, as amended by 48 Stat. L.
754 (1934), z6 U.S. C. (1934), § 4II (g): "The value of the gross estate 0£ the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside the United States • • • {g) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon hia
own life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all
other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his
own life.''
2 (C. Q. A. 1st, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 380.
8 THE SPECTATOR, INSURANCE YEAR BooK 166b-313b (1939). This growth was
predicted several years ago, as a result of the depression. See FITCH, WHAT' EVERYBODY WANTS To KNOW ABOUT ANNUITIES 54 (1934): "In spite of their numerous
advantages, it is undeniable that annuities have -not so far made very great headway
_in this country. • •• In the pioneer days of life insurance in the United States, annuities made up a large share of the insurance business, but their sale gradually diminished until some of the companies ceased to offer them.'' And at page 63, "Annuities
have not been popular, but it is not a rash prediction to assert that they wlll be increasingly purchased in the future. • • • Annuities have been ignored in the past,
but today millions are gazing with chastened spirits at the wrecks of their former hopes
of financial independence." See also CROBAUGH, ANNUITIES AND THEIR UsES 1 l 5
(1933), whose prediction, based on the growth from 1928 to 1932, of a million
and a quarter contracts by 1940 has been proved too conservative by a compilation of
business done by 173 companies, as seen in THE SPECTATOR, INSURANCE YEAR Boo:Kl
147a (1939). In the latter compilation, it was shown that there were 1,583,352 contracts outstanding at the end of 1938, as compared with II8,999 in 1928.
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death to the beneficiaries either $40,000 plus the accrued part of the
annuity payment next coming due, or the amount of the "premium"
less all payments made before the "annuitant's" death. The contract
provided for participation in dividends. There were also optional plans
for annuity or instalment payments at death instead of the lump sum payment. The contract had a cash surrender and loan value, and the decedent could change the beneficiaries. There was no evidence that decedent
submitted to a physical examination, although he was sixty-three years
of age at the time he entered into the contract. The commissioner disallowed the $40,000 life insurance exemption claimed by plaintiff executors under section 302 (g). The Board of Tax Appeals and the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld his ruling. There was no
discussion, either in the Board of Tax Appeals report or in the court's
opinion, of the section of the statute which justified the inclusion in
the gross estate of the amount payable to beneficiaries upon the annuitant's death.
The problem to be discussed in this comment is the differentiation
between insurance and annuity contracts, and the treatment of the
various types of contracts under the estate tax. Thus, the questions
for which a solution will be sought are: (I) How does an annuity
policy differ from an insurance policy? (2) Should an annuity contract be taxable, and on what theory should it be included or excluded? (3) Assuming a difference between annuities and insurance
policies, what should be the theory of taxation applicable to a contract
combining insurance and annuity features?
I.

Insurance has been variously defined. In the Old Colony Trust Co.
case, an insurance contract was defined as "one whereby, for a stipulated consideration, a party undertakes to indemnify another against
loss by a specified contingency or peril, called a 'risk.' In the case of
life insurance, the contingency is the death of the insured." This, with
minor variations, seems to be the definition generally accepted by the
courts.' An annuity contract, as defined by the Board of Tax Appeals
'Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. xst,
1939) 102 F. (2d) 380 at 382; Commonwealth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
254 Pa. 510, .98 A. 1072 (1916); In re Walsh, (D. C. Minn. 1937) 19 F. Supp ..
567; People ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 193 App. Div. 413, 184
N. Y. S. 345 (1920); Curtis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 217 Mass. 47, 104 N. E.
553 (1914); Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 18 S. Ct. 300 (18·97);
Rishel v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, (C. C. A. 10th, 1935) 78 F.
(2d) 881.
But see, Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213 at 225-226, 99 N. E.
299 (1912), where this definition is rejected in favor of the interpretation that insurance is "a contract to pay to the beneficiary a certain sum of money in the event of
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in the Old Colony Trust Co. case, is an "agreement to pay a specified
sum to the annuitant annually during life in consideration of a single
payment, which is not a 'premium.'" & These definitions, however,
are merely taken from other sources, and do not get at the real problem. References· to cases involving insurance company regulations,
bankruptcy, and other types of taxes may be somewhat useful by way
of analogy, but it is submitted that the analogy is. imperfect and
mechanical. The problem here is whether a particular contract is an
insurance policy within the meaning of section 302 (g) and thus
exempted to the extent of $40,000, or whether it is an annuity contract, to be treated in some other manner under the act. Consequently,
the inquiry should be into the purpose of the exemption allowed by the
statute. In the statute itself there is a distinction drawn between different types of policies: those payable to the estate are not exempted;
those payable to named beneficiaries are exempted up to $40,000.
It appears that the statute seeks to throw some protection around those
beneficiaries for whom the decedent has tried to make a certain provision, rather than those whom he has merely designated to share in
his bounty. In other words, the purpose seems to be to allow a certainty of provision for the favored beneficiaries because they are either
dependents of the insured or have some other "insurable interest" in
his life. Thus, the essential element of insurance which the statute
seeks to protect is indemnity against loss. This distinguishing feature
may be the one gleaned from mechanical definitions, but it is just
as possible that a court's definitional logic may be premised upon such
a concept of a life insurance contract as one "to pay to the beneficiary
a certain sum of money in the event of death." 8 The latter sort of
definition would let in almost any type of contract, and permit evasion
of taxes to the extent of $40,000 worth of property and the difference
in taxable rate that might be applied when that amount of property
is deducted from the estate, the evasion taking the form of an investment in the guise of insurance.
Annuities are said to be the exact reverse of insurance contracts. 7
The word "annuity" literally means a payment made each year. Disregarding the variations in the manner of purchase and of payment
death." In Moskowitz v. Davis, (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 818, the Keckley
case is accepted as stating the true definition, but the indemnity theory seems .to be
relied on in the course of the opinion.
& Old Colony Trust Co., 37 B. T. A. 435 at 438 (1938). See also, Commonwealth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 Pa. 510, 98 A. 1072 (1916).
8 Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213 at 225-226, 99 N~ E. 299
(1912).
7 HARWOOD and FRANCIS, INsµRANCE AND ANNUITIES FROM THE BUYER'S Po1NT
OF VtEW 120 (1935); Rishel v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, (C. C. A.
10th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 881.

COMMENTS

under the contract,8 an annuity is the purchase of a guaranteed income,
payable either to the purchaser or some other person. In the classic
type of annuity, in existence as long ago as Babylonian times,9 the
income terminates with the death of the annuitant. Because of the
objections to the loss of principal upon the premature death of the
annuitant, various types of "refund" annuities have been developed. 10
Throughout all such contracts, the fundamental concept is seen to be
investment-investment in a regular income. It might seem that a
refund annuity should be considered as having indemnity features;
that the annuitant thereby sought to provide a cushion for his beneficiaries against the contingency of his death. Perhaps there is some
element of provision for dependents therein, but the predominant
purpose is to make an investment that will yield a steady return of
the invested principal in its entirety.
But granting that the distinguishing features between the two
types of contracts are the differences between indemnity and investment, how can it be determined whether a contract is an indemnity
against loss, so as to bring it within the statutory· label of insurance?
Almost all insurance, excepting term insurance, has some investment
features. What factors must be present to show the distinction? Here,
perhaps, the cases involving statutory regulation of insurance, bankruptcy, and other types of taxes, may be helpful, in so far as they illustrate that certain factors in contracts are indicative of the indemnity
feature.
·
Probably the first thing to look for is the basis upon which the
company was willing tp issue the contract. Any insurance that is not
pure gambling must be based upon experience as to life expectancies.
If the purchase price of the contract is determined by the age of the
purchaser, there is some indication that the company is taking a risk
as to the length of life of the purchaser, and hence that they are contracting to indemnify against the contingency of his death. Therefore,
there should be a use of mortality tables, and the "premium" should
be proportioned to the life insurance risk as determined by those tables.
In the Old Colony Trost Co. case, as Judge Brewster pointed out, the
purchaser, in consideration of the payment of $42,000, was entitled to
receive a return of $1400 or approximately three and one-half per
cent on his investment per year, and had the right to demand at any
time the payment of $40,000 which was stated to be the face value
8 HARWOOD and FRANCIS, INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES FROM THE BuYER's POINT
OF VIEW u7-146 \1935); CRoBAUGH, ANNUITIES AND THEIR UsEs, 27-31 (1933).
9 HARWOOD and FRANCIS, INSURANCE AND ANUITIES TROM THE BUYER'S PoINT
OF VIEW 121 (1935). As to history of annuities, see also, CRoBAUGH, ANNUITIES AND
THEIR USES (1933).
10 See authorities cited in note 8, supra.
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of the policy. There was no risk undertaken by the company dependent
upon the duration of the life of the purchaser. Instead it was purely
an investment.11
Another factor to look for is the condition upon· which payment
or payments are· to be made by the company. In life insurance, the
contingency which gives rise to the loss that the company agrees to
indemnify against is the death of the purchaser.12 But the fact that the
company agrees to pay a stated sum to named beneficiaries upon the
death of the purchaser is not enough. This sort of provision is common
in many annuity contracts. There was such a provision in the contract
in the Old Colony Trust Co. case. In the ordinary life annuity, there
is no payment upon the death of the annuitant, but many modern
annuities do provide for such payments.18 However, such payments
in the case of annuities are in the nature of a return of capital, and
not a payment for a loss. In any dispute under the estate tax, there
will be such a provision for -payment upon death of the purchaser,
and the essential problem remains as to the nature of the payment.
To use this factor as a mark of identification for either insurance or
annuity is, of course, to beg the question. The court must still determine whether the company has contracted to indemnify the bene11 This distinction has been important to the decisions involved in at least three
classes of cases. In one type, questions have arisen as to the applicability of various
statutory regulations of the insurance and annuity business, and these questions have
depended upon whether the particular contract involved was an insurance policy or an
annuity contract. For instances of this case type, see: Helvering v. Illinois Life Ins.
Co., 299 U. S. 88, 57 S. Ct. 63 (1936); Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Ins. Co.,
294 U. S. 686, 55 S. Ct. 572 (1935); Rishel v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
California, (C. C. A. 10th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 881; Carroll v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, (D. C. Mo. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 223; People ex rel.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 193 App. Div. 413, 184 N. Y. S. 345 (1920);
Commonwealth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 Pa. 510, 98 A. 1072 (1916);
Cnrtis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1,17 Mass. 47, 104 N. E. 553 (1914).
In another class of cases; the question has arisen as to whether the proceeds of a
contract are includable in the estate of a bankrupt or are exempt under some state
statutory provision. See: In re Walsh, (D. C. Minn. 1937) 19 F. Supp. ·567; Moskowitz v. Davis, (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 818; In re Weick, (C. C. A. 6th
·1924) z F. (z.d) 647.
A third type of case in which the distinction is important is that involving the:
applicability of other taxes, such as state succession taxes, intangible taxes, and the federal
income tax. In re Thornton's Estate, 186 Minn. 351, 243 N. W. 389 (1932);
Bowman v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916 (1939);
Ballou v. Fisher, 154 Ore. 548, 61 P. (2d) 423 (1936); Lucas v. Alexander, (C. C. A.
6th, 1928) 1,7 F. (zd) 237.
12 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 1st,
1939) 102 F. (2d) 380.
18 HAR.woon and FRANCIS, INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES FROM THE BUYER'S PoINT
OP VIEW 120 (1935).
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fi.ciary, or to return money invested by the purchaser. But if this factor
is not present in the contract, the court can be sure that the contract
is not ·a life insurance policy.
A factor mentioned. in the insurance regulation, bankruptcy and
other tax cases, and mentioned also in the Old Colony Trust Co.
case, is whether or not the purchaser underwent a medical examination.1' This factor is intimately related to the first one mentioned,
for an examination is required before an insurance policy will be
issued, to determine whether or not the purchaser is an insurable risk.
If the company does not require an examination, it apparently is not
interested in_ the purchaser's life expectancy, and is not basing its
undertaking on a risk calculation.
The name of the policy and the phraseology employed therein,
though certainly not controlling, should be considered along with
other matters. For example, in the Old Colony Trust Co. case the
contract was described as a "Life Annuity Principal Sum Payable at
Death-Single Premium-Annual Dividends." At least the insurance
company had labelled the contract as an annuity rather than as an
insurance. Likewise, the purchaser was called the "annuitant." 111
Other incidental features often found in insurance policies may
be mentioned, such as participation in dividends, cash surrender and
loan values, power of selection of beneficiary, and control over manner of distribution of proceeds, but these features are no longer distinctive. The recent trend in the writing of annuity contracts has been
to include·such provisions.16
In attempting to distinguish these contracts, it is important to
note that the mere presence of investment features does not eliminate
the possibility of holding a contract to be an insurance policy. It is
only when the contract does provide for investment that there is any
problem, for if the contract were one for term insurance, without
any investment feature, no problem would be likely to arise under
H See note II, supra. In the Board of Tax Appeals opinion, 37 B. T. A. 435
at 437 (.1938), quoted in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
(C. C. A. ut, 1939) 1oz F. (zd) 380 at 382, appears this reference to the medical
examination: "there is no evidence that decedent applied for life insurance or submitted to the usual physical examination. The company appears to have been unconcerned with the element of life expectancy or physical. condition, even though decedent was 6fyears of age at the time he made the contract."
15 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 1st,
1939) IOZ F. (zd) 380. It should also be mentioned that the contract named the
payment made for the contract by decedent a "premium," but this fact was disregarded
as a loose use of terminology because of the many indications of the investment nature of
the contract.
16 HARWOOD and FRANCIS, INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES FROM THE BUYER'S PoINT
OF VIEW III, 128 (1935).
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the estate tax. There are ·policies which have investment features that
are many and varied, such as endowment and twenty-payment or
thirty-payment life policies.11 But in such policies investment is not
the dominant purpose or feature. If a contract is principally designed
to provide for the contingency of the death of the purchaser, the
investment provisions may be considered as incidental thereto, even
though, financially, they may be the larger portion of the contract.
2.

Once it is determined that a particular contract is ·an insurance
policy, the problem is simply one of including it as specifically provided in section 302 (g), and taking the deduction allowed by that
section. But if it is determined that it is not insurance, but is predominately . an investment or an annuity contract, there is quite a
di:fferent problem. There is no specific provision in the estate tax for
money that has been invested in an annuity and that is to be returned
to specified beneficiaries. As stated in the facts of the Old Colony
Trust Co. case, no comment was made either by the Board of Tax
Appeals or in the opinion of the circuit court of appeals as to the
theory for inclusion of the annuity; no reference was made to any
section of the· statute which justified its taxability. So far as the writer
can ascertain, there are no cases or rulings which would give a hint
as to the theory of taxability of such annuity payment. One would
not have much hesitancy in declaring that such a contract should be
taxable under some theory, and although Congress has not seen fit
to make special provision for it, one feels that there ought to be some
general section into which it could be fitted. The applicable provision
would have to be found in section 302 of the estate tax,18 for that is
the section dealing with property to be included in the gross estate.
Of that section, only subsections (a), (c), and (d) might be said to
cover this. situation.
Section 302 (a) is the catch-all provision of the statute, not having reference to any particular factual situation, but requiring that
all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, to the extent of the interest of the decedent therein at the time
of his death; be included in his gross estate.19 It might be possible to
bring the annuity contract within this provision, although the official
regulations make no specific reference to annuities in connection with
the section. 20 The language of the section would seem to be broad
1'1

18

Ibid., ·10-3 I.
44 Stat. L. 70 (1926), as amended by 48 Stat. L. 754, 26 U. S. C. (1934),

§ 4n.
19

Ibid.

20

TREAS. REG.

So, 1937 ed., art. 13, p. 44•
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enough to cover the case, for an annuitant has the beneficial ownership of the sum to be refunded under the annuity. The interest in,
and right to claim, this sum passes upon the annuitant's death to the
designated beneficiaries, and may properly be called a property interest within section 302 (a).
Or perhaps the refund annuity might be brought within the purview of section 302 (c). 21 This section has usually been mentioned
in connection with trust transfers, and may have been designed for
that purpose alone, but it speaks of a transfer by trust "or otherwise."
Thus, statutory intent to include a transfer of the sort under discussion
may be lacking, but the clear words of the statute probably cover the
case, and the Supreme Court has held that to be sufficient. 22 Certainly
an annuitant makes a transfer, and retains for a "period which does
not in fact end before his death . . . the right to the income from,
the property," and also retains "the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom." ~s If the court is at
all inclined to close loopholes in the tax law, cases involving refund
annuities, as they arise, could well be brought within this section. If
it is felt that an annuitant has an insufficient property interest in the
right to a refund of his investment so that section 302 (a) does not
apply, it ought to be said that he has attached sufficient "strings" to
the transfer to make it taxable under section 302 (c).
Section 302 (d) might also be suggested as a basis for taxing such
annuities.:u Again there is a transfer otherwise than by trust, and the
argument might be made that the annuitant has retained a power to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the distribution of his property.
The argument here is quite similar to that under the preceding section.
In making these arguments for inclusion of annuities, it should
be noted that there is an entirely different approach under the first
subsection than under the other two. In the former, the taxable interest is said to be in the right to the refund which the annuitant receives as part of the consideration for his transfer to the company.
In the latter, the interest is in the money itself that was transferred to
the company; however, the interest therein is measured by the extent
to which the transferor retains some control over the property, so that
the distinction would not seem to be of vital importance.
21 44 Stat. L. 70 (1926), as amended by 46 Stat. L. 1516 (1931), and 47
Stat. L. 279 (1932), 26 U. S. C. (1934), § 411 (c).
22 Helvering v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 56 S. Ct. 70
(1935).
28 Quotations are from statute, supra, note 2 I.
2 ~ 44 Stat. L. 71, as amended by 48 Stat, L. 752 (1934), and 49 Stat. L. 17441745 (1936), 26 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 411 (d).
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It should also be noted that this entire discussion of the inclusion of
annuities in the gross estate must be limited to those particular annuities with refund provisions. 25 The pure form of life annuity which
terminates upon the death of the annuitant leaves nothing to be taxed;
the transfer to the company is merely an expenditure by the annuitant
for his benefit. However, under the relatively modern contracts which
provide for a return of capital to designated beneficiaries,26 there is a
beneficial interest passing at least indirectly from the decedent.

3.
To increase the salability of their contracts, insurance companies
now offer such a hodge-podge of provisions within single contracts that
one can buy a contract with almost any combination of insurance and
annuity features one might desire. These heterogeneities will undoubtedly be attractive to buyers and increase salesmen's commissions,
but they will also furnish difficulties for courts and lawyers. The first
problem met in considering their taxability is one of divisibility of the
contract; i.e., a question as to the separability of the annuity and insurance features. In some cases, this should be an easy matter, for some
policies are clearly divided. The contract may state what portion of
the "premium" is allocable to insurance and what to annuity, and the
company may so allocate these portions to different funds. If all provisions of the contract carry out such a clear division, it would be a
simple matter to include the portion payable as insurance in the gross
estate under the mandate of section 302 (g), and to include the
remainder of the sum payable under the authority of section 302 (a),
(c), or (d), as suggested above. 21
However, such division will usually not be so simple. In the Old
Colony Trust Co. case, the executors claimed that the contract was at
least divisible, if not an insurance contract in its entirety. In that case,
the contract stipulated that the "premium" paid purchased a life
annuity and a-paid-up life insurance policy; the company, in accordance with customary practice, allocated this purchase-price to annuity
and insurance funds. Nevertheless, the benefits under the contract
were held taxable solely as an annuity, and properly so. Other provisions of the contract had not indicated the necessary indemnity aspect
of the so-called paid-up life insurance policy: there was no calculation
of risk in accordance with the purchaser's age, nor use of mortality
25

See note 8, supra.

28 CRoBAUGH, ANNUITIES AND THEIR UsES 27-31 (1933); HARWOOD and FRANc1s, INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES FROM THE BUYER'S PoINT OF V1Ew 120, 121 (1935).
27 Bowman v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916
(1939). In this case the contract was actually held divisible, and the insurance feature
exempt from taxation under the Ohio intangibles tax.
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tables; there was no provision for indemnity against loss-instead there
was only a promise to return principal; there was no medical examination; the name of the contract and the terms used therein indicated an
annuity rather than insurance. In such case it is impossible to say that
any part of the contract comes within the statutory definition of insurance. The taxpayer has failed to prove a right to the exemption of'
section 302 (g). As pointed out by Mr. Harron, who wrote the Board
of Tax Appeals opinion in the Old Colony Trust Co. case,28 "The
exemption referred to is one of legislative grace." The taxpayer should
clearly show a right thereto.
If the contract is indivisible, how should it be taxed? There would
seem to be but one answer to this question. The test would then be:
What is the predominant feature of the contract? Was the primary
aim of the purchaser to provide an indemnity for his beneficiary, or
was his principal purpose only to make an investment? This was the
test applied by Judge Brewster,29 following the practice in the other
cases where insurance and annuity are distinguished. so A new battlefield in taxation over this distinction will undoubtedly appear in the
next few years.
Charles F. Dugan
Old Colony Trust Co., 37 B. T. A. 435 at 439 (1938).
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. ut,
1939) 102 F. (2d) 380 at 383: "the petitioner's contention that the policy combines
an annuity feature and a life insurance feature, and, so far as it provides for a payment
of the principal sum on the death of the insured • • • is an insurance contract •••
is not sound because the obligations of the company were such that the investment
feature predominates and gives character to the contract."
ao See note I 1, supra.
28

29

